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Abstract
CVE is complex. It requires combatting the narratives and ideology of many extremist
groups around the globe, constructing environments with appealing alternatives to
extremism, and most importantly, sensitivity to the variety of circumstances in which
CVE takes place to effectively battle the root causes of extremism. Constructing a
complete CVE effort thus requires a great variety of skills, coordinated to efficient
implementation. Despite notional commitment, U.S. CVE abroad lacks interagency
coordination. JIATF-S offers a strong model of interagency coordination, from which
lessons may be applied to the formation of an interagency CVE effort. Interagency
coordination would bring extensive expertise and resources to bear on CVE operations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In the White House’s 2015 National Security Strategy, former President Barack
Obama wrote: “In the long-term, our efforts to work with other countries to counter the
ideology and root causes of violent extremism will be more important than our capacity
to remove terrorists from the battlefield.”1 This effort has taken the form of Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE). Later that year, the White House convened an international
CVE summit and committed to a surge in funding for CVE efforts abroad and at home.2
CVE is essential to a sustainable counterterrorism strategy – even if one group is largely
wiped out, evidence demonstrates ideology survives, quickly reigniting violent
extremism. A purely kinetic counterterrorism strategy threatens to eliminate terrorists,
only to have two more fill their place, sustaining an unending cycle of violence. CVE
works to destroy the allure of terrorist groups to its would-be recruits. It takes many
forms as it is entirely context specific – it aims to strengthen vulnerable communities by
addressing whatever factors make that community most vulnerable. Broadly, generally,
and perhaps optimistically, CVE builds better lives for those in targeted communities
through development programs – the motivation being that a thriving community will
exhibit greater resilience to violent extremist recruitment. There are certainly exceptions
– a CVE policy purely comprised of targeted interventions has the potential to imbed
discrimination and perpetuate suspicion of minorities. But CVE more akin to sustained
development, focusing on the structural reasons for radicalization, aligns quite neatly

The White House, “National Security Strategy: February 2015.”
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf
2
U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on
Countering Violent Extremism,” February 18, 2015. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism
1
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with the goals of local economic development, even if some development professionals
are upset that recipients of CVE aid are in securitized regions, to the detriment of those
where extremism has not taken hold. CVE that comprises development is no different to
regular development assistance, aside from the process of targeting. CVE is only
concerned with locations most exploitable by violent extremists, non-CVE development
assistance has broader criteria for project selection. CVE may extend beyond
development assistance to state-building. CVE programs sometimes aim to strengthen
local governance institutions, like law enforcement, for the purpose of strengthening
resilience to violent extremist groups. Definitions of CVE remain vague. A CVE program
may take so many different forms, dependent on the specific context of each targeted
community, that attempting to narrow CVE’s definition would risk unduly restricting
CVE’s potential applications and prove no more useful than its present definition.
CVE’s exceptionally broad definition leaves room for many interpretations of
how it ought to be implemented, but the major U.S. foreign policy agencies concur on
one thing: CVE is essential for a sustainable counterterrorism strategy. Despite notional
commitment to CVE, implementation has been lackluster and uncoordinated, and
“globally the threat of violent extremism is higher today than in August 2001.”3 Military
solutions remain the primary choice for combatting extremist violence, despite increasing
evidence that “domestic governance capacities are more effective than increased military

Edward Powers, “The Military’s Role in Countering Violent Extremism,” United States Institute of
Peace, June 7, 2017. https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/06/militarys-role-countering-violentextremism
3
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capacities in sustainably addressing community grievance.”4 U.S. CVE abroad features a
void of interagency coordination, even though CVE programming requires a complex
network of programs to achieve meaningful results. CVE amounts to securitized
development assistance and state-building, yet no mechanisms are in place to facilitate
such a grand undertaking.
Deep knowledge of local culture and societal structures is the primary
requirement for CVE, whether domestic or international. Without understanding the
factors that contribute to radicalization, CVE efforts act blindly. In 2014, the Department
of Defense (DoD) Defense Science Board (DSB) formed a task force to wholly review
and assess U.S. CVE abroad.5 The DSB CVE Task Force outlined the key ingredients for
successful CVE. Important points include: granting power to those on the ground to
increase efficiency and use the regional expertise possessed by USG agencies; “[match]
CVE responsibilities to authorities, resources, and accesses;”6 develop evaluation
methods and enact proportional responses to subsequent feedback. In terms of
implementation, the DSB advocates for targeted economic development, institution
building, developing messaging for vulnerable groups, and ensuring that CVE actions are
aligned with those messages.7 Finally, coordination is essential. The DSB Task Force
placed ‘strengthening the coordination process’ as its first recommendation in its 2014

“A U.S. Humanitarian, Development and Peacebuilding Statement on the U.S. Global Countering Violent
Extremism Agenda,” July 20, 2015. http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/site/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/Statement-FINAL.pdf
5
Department of Defense Defense Science Board, “Task Force on Department of Defense Strategy to
Counter Violent Extremism Outside of the United States,” April, 2015.
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/DSB-CVE-FinalReport-April172015.pdf
6
Ibid., 2.
7
Ibid., 1.
4
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task force report.8 Most significantly, it noted that organizing CVE by country is less
effective than organizing by region, as “our efforts will miss the crucial regional nature of
the CVE phenomenon.”9
Alarmingly, CVE has been cast aside by the Trump Administration. Trump’s
critique of CVE stems from the view that CVE was insufficiently targeting ideology, and
that “emphasis on engaging and empowering communities is too politically correct.”10
However, CVE has not been entirely abandoned – State’s 2017 budget allocated its
largest amount to CVE yet.11 This paper explores interagency coordination in the context
of CVE. CVE cannot flourish without effective interagency coordination, and evaluations
as to its efficacy will be premature until CVE has been attempted wholeheartedly, with
the resources and coordination required.
Domestic CVE - Origins and Growth
The notion of combatting terrorism with non-military options has been suggested
in policy environments since 2001, and has since evolved into applications abroad and
domestically.12 The United Kingdom implemented the first official domestic CVE
program in 2005 – Prevent,13 which aimed to combat extremist ideology, provide support
to ‘at-risk communities,’ and perform capacity building.14 Soon after, the EU developed a

8

Ibid., 2.
Ibid., 2.
10
Andrew Glazzard and Eric Rosand, “Is It All Over for CVE?” Lawfare, June 11, 2017,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/it-all-over-cve
11
Ibid.
12
Owen Frazer and Christian Nunlist, “The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism,” CSS Analyses, No.
183 (2015): 2, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securitiesstudies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse183-EN.pdf
13
Ibid.
14
UK Government, “2010 to 2015 government policy: counter-terrorism,” May 8, 2015,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-counter-terrorism/2010-to2015-government-policy-counter-terrorism#appendix-2-prevent
9
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counterterrorism strategy featuring a similar focus on understanding how an individual
may be made vulnerable by societal conditions. Many other countries, including Canada,
Australia, and the United States had followed suit by 2011.15
Prevent comprised one quarter of the UK’s counterterrorism strategy, the other
three being: “Prepare; Protect; and Pursue.”16 Prevent focused on fighting all extremist
ideology, both through undermining its societal origins and by building relationships with
key community figures who had the perspective to report any suspicious individuals.17
These community leaders are legally required to “monitor for ‘vulnerability indicators’
that suggest people are ‘turn[ing] towards terrorism.’”18 These indicators may be
moderate changes in physical appearance or personal conduct.19
Domestic CVE in the U.S. began in 2011, largely modeled on Prevent.20 A major
difference is policing of expression in the U.S. is expressly forbidden under the first
amendment, requiring removal of some aspects of Prevent. For example, the UK
government actively combats “‘extremism’ of thought and belief among Muslims.”21
CVE in the U.S. otherwise largely resembled that of the UK. The initial CVE strategy
had 3 main goals: “1) enhancing federal community engagement efforts related to CVE,

Owen Frazer and Christian Nunlist, “The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism,” CSS Analyses, No.
183 (2015): 2, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securitiesstudies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse183-EN.pdf
16
UK Government, “2010 to 2015 government policy: counter-terrorism,” May 8, 2015,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-counter-terrorism/2010-to2015-government-policy-counter-terrorism#appendix-2-prevent
17
Ibid.
18
Simon Cottee, “The Pre-Terrorists Among Us,” The Atlantic, October 27, 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/counterterrorism-prevention-britain-isis/412603/
19
Ibid.
20
Jerome P. Bjelopera, “Countering Violent Extremism in the United States,” Congressional Research
Service, February 19, 2014, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf
21
Faiza Patel, “Counter-Radicalization Lessons From the United Kingdom,” Brennan Center for Justice,
July 28, 2011, https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/counter-radicalization-lessons-united-kingdom
15
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2) developing greater government and law enforcement for preventing violent extremism,
and 3) countering violent extremism propaganda.”22 U.S. CVE was also similar in its use
of individual interventions, and its major flaw of discrimination – both undermining its
efficacy by eroding trust with communities and failing to target non-Islamic violent
extremism.
From the start, domestic U.S. CVE lacked proper implementation, funding, and a
lead agency.23 The threat of radicalization in the U.S. is significantly lower than in
Europe,24 somewhat justifying the U.S.’ slow adoption of CVE policy. Domestic CVE
has grown slowly, only receiving a significant increase of attention after the 2015 White
House CVE Summit. CVE began as local initiatives, and has since expanded to the
federal government. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of
Homeland Security are part of an interagency CVE Task Force, and contribute their
relevant skills or expertise to research and implementation of domestic CVE.25
Initially, the federal government largely left CVE implementation to
communities, under the assumption that those within the community understood its
problems better than they did. Thus, implementation was voluntary and occurred rarely,

Jerome P. Bjelopera, “Countering Violent Extremism in the United States,” Congressional Research
Service, February 19, 2014, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf
23
Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, “Countering Violent Extremism in America,” Center for Cyber &
Homeland Security, June, 2015, Executive Summary,
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20in%20America.pdf
24
Ibid.
25
Eric Rosand, “Fixing CVE in the United States requires more than just a name change,” Brookings,
February 16, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/02/16/fixing-cve-in-the-unitedstates-requires-more-than-just-a-name-change/; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “CVE: Task
Force,” https://www.dhs.gov/cve/task-force
22
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“with little institutional backing or recognition.”26 Small groups of individuals in federal
agencies did attempt to enact minor programs. DHS and NCTC coordinated with many
US. Attorney’s Offices in one of the first domestic CVE programs: Community
Resilience Exercise (CREX), which engaged law enforcement officers and members of
Muslim communities “to address a hypothetical scenario of an individual appearing to
radicalize to violence.”27
A sense that terrorism, both domestic and international, was on the rise caused an
increase in desire for CVE policy: according to Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes,
scholars of extremism, “First the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and later the rise
of ISIS triggered a renewed focus on CVE.”28 As a result, the administration launched the
‘Three City Pilot,’ aiming to implement CVE in Los Angeles, Boston, and MinneapolisSt. Paul.29 The stakeholders drawn into the program were varied, including NGOs,
“community leaders, and federal, state, and local government officials.”30 Like Prevent,
the Three City Pilot featured a targeted intervention program, where those close to an
individual ought to be watchful for ‘vulnerability indicators,’31 resulting in similar
criticism as was levied against Prevent.
The Brennan Center for Justice writes that the foundations of U.S. domestic CVE
strategy were flawed. Most significantly, the path to terrorism is far more opaque and
unpredictable than previously believed. There is no set of signature characteristics that

Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, “Countering Violent Extremism in America,” Center for Cyber &
Homeland Security, June, 2015, 6-7,
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20in%20America.pdf
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid., 7.
29
Ibid., 7.
30
Ibid., 7.
31
Ibid., 10.
26
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reliably identify those likely to radicalize, and the characteristics commonly believed to
be significant act as ineffective markers.32 A belief in extremist ideology is not an
indicator for potential acts of terrorism. Indeed, a 2008 study by MI5 found that “a wellestablished religious identity actually protects against violent radicalism,” and that many
of those committing acts of terror were “religious novices.”33 Finally, all domestic CVE
is aimed at Muslims. Yet “between 2000 and 2013 the vast majority of attacks in the
homeland were carried out by non-Islamist extremists.”34
The UK’s CVE has likewise been criticized. As Simon Cottee of The Atlantic
writes, similar ‘vulnerability indicators’ will be found in those undergoing a variety of
conversions, even to non-violent creeds: “The danger of CVE is that it risks conflating
the two and promotes an atmosphere of mistrust.”35 More recently, Prevent has been
criticized for discriminating against Muslim communities. According to Faiza Patel, a
scholar at the Brennan Center for Justice, Prevent is “just thought police disguised as
ostensible concern about vulnerable Muslim youth.”36 She adds that the intrusive nature
of Prevent isolates the communities the program aims to coopt.37 Police and some

Faiza Patel and Meghan Koushik, “Countering Violent Extremism,” Brennan Center for Justice, March
16, 2017, https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/countering-violent-extremism
33
Alan Travis, “MI5 report challenges view on terrorism in Britain,” The Guardian, August 20, 2008,
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1
34
Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, “Countering Violent Extremism in America,” Center for Cyber &
Homeland Security, June, 2015, 11,
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20in%20America.pdf
35
Simon Cottee, “The Pre-Terrorists Among Us,” The Atlantic, October 27, 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/counterterrorism-prevention-britain-isis/412603/
36
Faiza Patel, “Counter-Radicalization Lessons From the United Kingdom,” Brennan Center for Justice,
July 28, 2011, https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/counter-radicalization-lessons-united-kingdom
37
Ibid.
32
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governing officials asserted the program’s effectiveness,38 but CVE has evolved beyond
the micro-focus on individuals that characterized Prevent.39
There is no apparent evidence that CVE abroad suffers from the prejudicial biases
of domestic CVE in the U.S. and UK. In 2015, the White House hosted a CVE summit
with domestic and international leaders, facilitating a surge of awareness and funding,
and catalyzing a turning point in U.S. domestic CVE strategy. The administration
committed to increased funding, establishing a leader for the domestic CVE community,
conducting research with global partners on CVE techniques, and addressing societal
structures that made individuals vulnerable to radicalization,40 rather than rely on
arbitrary ‘vulnerability indicators,’ as nascent domestic CVE did.
U.S. CVE Abroad – Relevant Actors
The scale of U.S. CVE abroad grew more quickly than domestic CVE. The
primary agencies of U.S. foreign policy, DoD, Department of State (DoS), and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), were aware of the value of CVE even
as it was just beginning to reach a domestic audience. In its war on terror, the Obama
administration identified CVE abroad as essential to a successful counterterrorism
strategy.41 Extremist ideology cannot be destroyed with conventional weaponry; to
eradicate threatening extremist groups, the U.S. realized that it is necessary “to address

BBC, “Reality Check: What is the Prevent strategy?” BBC, June 4, 2017,
http://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-40151991
39
Owen Frazer and Christian Nunlist, “The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism,” CSS Analyses, No.
183 (2015): 3, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securitiesstudies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse183-EN.pdf
40
U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on
Countering Violent Extremism,” February 18, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism
41
U.S. Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Programs and
Initiatives, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#CVE
38
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the entire life cycle of radicalization to violent extremism.”42 In 2010, the Senate
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities held a hearing regarding U.S.
Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism. Garry Reid, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, acknowledged
the impossibility of kinetic operations as the single tool necessary for victory. He
emphasized the significance of counterextremist efforts, adding that DoD is aware that
the manner in which it conducts its CT operations directly influences counterextremism
objectives.43 As Chris Meserole of Brookings rightly notes, ideology is passed from one
‘defeated’ extremist organization to “successor groups… if we are to rely on
counterterrorism alone, we are destined to play an endless game of global whack-amole.”44
DoD’s role in CVE is unclear. It conducts stability operations, but does not
officially engage in CVE, despite a clear awareness of its value. A reason for DoD’s
absence is given in the Task Force Report it commissioned from the Defense Science
Board. The Chairman of the DSB, Craig Fields, in his memorandum to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, writes:
The Task Force acknowledges that DoD may not be the right organization–in
terms of authority, capabilities, and / or expertise–to carry out many CVE tasks,
particularly over the longer term. As DoD transitions away from large-scale
deployments with combat missions, it will be more important to specify which
CVE responsibilities it should lead, and which it should support.45
42

Ibid.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Government Efforts to Counter Violent
Extremism, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 2010, 63-687, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG111shrg63687/html/CHRG-111shrg63687.htm
44
Chris Meserole, “CVE in the age of Trump,” Brookings, December 14, 2016,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/12/14/cve-in-the-age-of-trump/
45
Department of Defense Defense Science Board, “Task Force on Department of Defense Strategy to
Counter Violent Extremism Outside of the United States,” April, 2015, Table of Contents: 1,
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/DSB-CVE-FinalReport-April172015.pdf
43
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DoD has no CVE strategy, but some of its operations coincide with goals of CVE, and
would fall within CVE, including: “Security Force Assistance… Civil Affairs
Operations… [and] Military Information Support Operations.”46 DoD requires executive
authorization to lead operations akin to CVE: to take the lead in Foreign Internal Defense
capacity building operations, DoD needs “a deployment or execution order from the
President or Secretary of Defense.”47 DoS is the lead agency when the U.S. provides
security assistance.48 Thus, DoS is a logical choice to lead CVE operations abroad.
However, as this thesis explores the issue of leadership in CVE, it finds DoS does not
possess the resources or capacity for doing so. On the other hand, DoD lacks even
internal coordination on CVE. The DSB Task force found that:
there is no clear, common definition of CVE and no overarching strategy for
where CVE fits within that definition. This risks the implementation of CVE
functions into DoD roles and missions could be piecemeal and ad hoc. The Task
Force saw little evidence that, below the Secretary of Defense, there is a single
responsible person or organization from which or to which direction is flowing,
guiding the combatant commanders on allocating resources and focusing attention
on CVE.49
In the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), DoD appears keen to coordinate
on CVE, saying the U.S. will face the threat of violent extremism “using a combination
of economic, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, development, and military
tools.”50 DoD’s choice to list military options at the end of its list may imply awareness

Department of Defense Defense Science Board, “Task Force on Department of Defense Strategy to
Counter Violent Extremism Outside of the United States,” April, 2015, 13,
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/DSB-CVE-FinalReport-April172015.pdf
47
Ibid., 14.
48
Ibid., 14.
49
Ibid., 14.
50
U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” March 4, 2014, VII,
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf
46
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of CVE’s complexity and the necessity of a nuanced CVE strategy. DoD also mentions
‘rebalancing’ of their CT, allocating “greater emphasis on building partnership
capacity,”51 indicating an understanding that a comprehensive, long-term CT strategy
must strengthen partner-nation security institutions – one aspect of CVE.
As of 2011, both DoS and USAID began establishing CVE strategies.52 USAID
and DoS are the primary organizations running U.S. CVE programs abroad. As such,
their 2016 Joint Strategy is an ideal document to gain an understanding of what CVE
programming entails. CVE’s broad mandate is to remove or alleviate the drivers of
violent extremism. CVE must accurately identify factors that push or pull individuals to
commit violent extremism or join groups engaging in violent extremism, and work to
ameliorate those factors.
The State Department defines CVE as “efforts to prevent violent extremists and
their supporters from radicalizing, recruiting, or inspiring individuals or groups in the
United States and abroad to commit acts of violence.”53 USAID comments that “precise
definitions have eluded many experts,”54 but drew a definition of violent extremism
based on other agencies’ definitions, expert opinions, and USAID’s own experience:
“Violent extremism refers to advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting
ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political
objectives.”55 A joint DoS-USAID CVE strategy document defines CVE as: “proactive

51

Ibid.
U.S. Department of State, “Discussion Paper on Countering Violent Extremism,” February 28, 2017,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/Discussion-Paper-on-CVE-C06137065.pdf
53
U.S. Department of State, “Countering Violent Extremism,” https://www.state.gov/j/cve/
54
United States Agency for International Development, “The Development Response to Violent Extremism
and Insurgency,” September 2011, 2,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final.pdf
55
Ibid.
52
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actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize
followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate violent extremism
recruitment and radicalization to violence.”56 The DSB remarked on the variety of
definitions for CVE, even just within DoD.57 The Board’s best effort at a definition
consistent with such variety follows: “…violent extremism generally targeting innocent
civilians vice combatants. This definition includes a full range of activities related to
CVE, from countering inspiration and radicalization, to building community resilience
and law-enforcement capacity, to countering extremism messaging.”58 The Board also
concludes that “kinetic operations” are outside the scope of CVE.59 No definitions
explicitly exclude any activities included in other definitions, and any exclusive additions
to one definition may fall under the broader aspects of others.
In the Department of State (DoS), the Bureau of Counterterrorism is the core of
CVE. Its webpage elaborates:
Countering violent extremism (CVE) is a pillar of the Administration’s strategic
approach to counterterrorism, and is an increasingly critical component of a
comprehensive and sustainable counterterrorism strategy that seeks to address the
entire life cycle of radicalization to violent extremism.60

56

United States Department of State and United States Agency for International Development,
“Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism,” May, 2016, 4,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/FINAL%20-%20State%20and%20USAID%20Joint%20Strategy%20on%20Countering%20Violent%20Extremism%20
%28May%202016%29.pdf
57
United States Department of Defense Defense Science Board, “Task Force on Department of Defense
Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism Outside of the United States,” Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, April, 2015, 1,
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/DSB-CVE-FinalReport-April172015.pdf
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
U.S. Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Programs and
Initiatives, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#CVE
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DoS’ CVE strategy focuses primarily on strengthening the capacity of foreign
government and society, penetrating all sectors of society to counter radicalization. DoS’
strategy may be summed as ‘redirection.’ It aims to create alternate paths for those at risk
of falling prey to radicalization, partially “through the criminal justice sector, such as
police-community engagement, diversion programs, and juvenile justice.”61 DoS partners
with “a range of Department stakeholders, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and other interagency partners.”62 The Bureau of Counterterrorism fails to
mention DoD, implying a lack of consolidated collaboration on CVE between the State
and Defense Departments.
In 2011, USAID released The Development Response to Violent Extremism and
Insurgency. It creates a “policy framework” for enhancing CVE efforts and improving
coordination with USAID’s CVE partners.63 The document explicitly defines violent
extremism: “Violent extremism refers to advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise
supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and
political objectives.”64 The policy document displays a considerable knowledge of the
roots of violent extremism. USAID finds evidence based programming to be essential to
CVE success, yet where USAID finds such evidence remains unclear.
Understanding of successful CVE programming has evolved since its inception in
the UK. Initial CVE programs focused on individuals, and aimed to recognize re-

61

Ibid.
Ibid.
63
Melissa Brown et al., The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting
Principles into Practice, USAID, September, 2011, iv,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final.pdf
64
United States Agency for International Development, “The Development Response to Violent Extremism
and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice,” September, 2011, 2,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final.pdf
62
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observable patterns indicating a likelihood to commit acts of terrorism. CVE abroad has
been the subject of extensive research by think tanks and government-sponsored research
networks.65 Over time, many recognized that CVE needs to apply to broader societal and
structural issues. CVE is essential to a complete counterterrorism policy because the
structural factors inciting violent extremism are forgotten with traditional military
solutions.66 As former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon remarked, “Missiles may kill
terrorists but I am convinced that good governance will kill terrorism.”67
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Chapter 2: CVE Requires Coordination – The Interagency
CVE is complex. It requires combatting the narratives and ideology of many
extremist groups around the globe, constructing environments with appealing alternatives
to extremism, and most importantly, sensitivity to the variety of circumstances in which
CVE takes place to effectively battle the root causes of extremism. Constructing a
complete CVE effort thus requires a great variety of skills, coordinated to efficient
implementation. Effective CVE abroad incorporates partners outside of the U.S.
apparatus, meaning coordination between agencies is further complicated by the
necessary inclusion of outside partners. CVE requires extensive intelligence, local
cooperation, regional expertise, autonomy for actors on the ground, evaluation,
messaging aligned with the actions of CVE programming, and accurate assigning of
resources and authorities. Many of these are only impossible without, and all would
benefit significantly from, interagency coordination. The DSB Task Force found that
massive collaboration is essential for successful CVE: “Successfully countering violent
extremism abroad requires a multilateral approach in which the USG needs to leverage its
diverse partnerships to bring a complementary package of authorities, resources, and
expertise to bear against this challenging and evolving threat.”68 The Center for Strategic
& International Studies (CSIS) published a CVE strategy in 2016 to offer the next
administration a comprehensive guide to CVE.69 The report emphasizes the urgent need
for greater resources, and an effective operation, with solid coordination, to funnel them
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into. It underlines the necessity of developing extensive partnerships with those outside
the U.S. government and constructing more effective interagency coordination, where
previous efforts were fragmented.70 Also in 2016, DoS released a joint CVE strategy with
USAID, which emphasizes the need to further understand the plethora of origins of VE,
and for wholehearted cooperation between DoS and USAID.71 Such coordination is
challenged by an administration hostile to CVE. Although, as mentioned earlier, State’s
approved funding for CVE in 2017 was its higher yet, so support for CVE in Congress
clearly supersedes the fluctuations of administration cycles. Given the distinct entities
that have posited CVE strategies entirely separately – the DSB on behalf of DoD, and
USAID jointly with DoS – one may reasonably assume that interagency communication
on the issue of CVE is lacking.
Bureaucratic Structure
Part of the problem with CVE coordination is institutional and structural. The
U.S. executive bureaucracy is comprised of cabinet departments, independent executive
agencies, independent regulatory agencies, and government organizations, as well as
departments and commissions, many of which exist under the umbrellas of larger entities.
Each of these has its own set of interests, incentives, and expertise. Secretaries of cabinet
departments are political appointees and report directly to the President, while some
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undersecretaries are permanent.72 The bureaucracy is structured such that instructions are
passed to or formulated by the Secretaries, then passed down through their respective
agencies. This ‘stove pipe’ structure inhibits effective coordination between agencies.73
Further, overlapping mandates or unclear allocation of responsibility incites friction as
each agency directly competes with others for greater budgets and operational space.74
Each cabinet agency originated in response to the needs of the time in which it formed.
For example, the Cold War resulted in DoD, NSC, and CIA, and 9/11 resulted in DHS.75
Each agency had a primary focus in its nascent period, and given that it was formulated
in response to a specific crisis or need, was largely suited to effectively function in those
circumstances. Threats have evolved significantly, yet the institutional structures have
failed to keep up. “The ‘outdated bureaucratic superstructure’ of the 20th century is an
inadequate basis for protecting the nation from 21st century security challenges.”76 New
threats are not specially constructed to suit a particular agency’s area of expertise, and
thus combatting them requires the capacities of multiple agencies in unity. The present
bureaucratic structure impedes the necessary level of coordination. Although there are
formal and informal constructs for interagency coordination “Agencies do not coordinate
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sufficiently, in Washington or the field, on planning or execution of national security
activities.”77
Like many state-built structures before it, components of the interagency emerged
largely as a result of war.78 The present Departments of State and Defense have grown
immensely since World War II.79 The Department of State (DoS) grew from 1228
employees in 1900 to about 70000 in 2017.80 The Department of Defense (DoS) evolved
into its present form with the 1947 National Security Act and its amendments –
establishing the Secretary of Defense’s role above individual military branches. That
legislation also created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security
Council (NSC).81 As agencies grow so do their areas of responsibility, and with them, the
complexity of facilitating interagency coordination.
State of the Interagency
The interagency is composed of the threads connecting each agency within the
U.S. government. Any actions or operations comprising multiple agencies falls under the
banner of the interagency. Rather than being a single entity, the interagency is simply the
method by which certain actions are taken, leaving the definition rather broad. There are
few formal interagency coordination mechanisms. One of the primary issues in defining
the interagency stems from its essence – as it is not an entity but a process, interagency
cooperation is largely unstructured and fluid, dependent entirely on the actors involved
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for its success. Further, as the number of actors in an interagency operation or decisionmaking process increases, the speed of consensus-reaching falls significantly.82
The most prominent interagency entity, albeit one technically without power, is
the National Security Council (NSC), its subcommittees (variously called Policy
Coordination Committees (PCCs) or Interagency Working Groups (IWGs)) and any
subordinate working groups they establish.83 Although it is only an advisory body, thus
lacking formal authority, the NSC brings together representatives, who possess authority
in their respective agencies, from a large cross-section of government entities to direct
matters of national security. The NSC is ineffective at enabling sustained interagency
operations, but effectively facilitates dialogue between agencies when formulating
national security policy.84 Below the NSC are interagency committees (PCCs or IWGs) –
those with senior level members may be chaired by an NSC official.85 Interagency
committees may be formed to gain a variety of perspectives on a range of issues, from the
invasion of another state to minor diplomatic incidents.86
The U.S. interagency framework is constructed to facilitate greater effectiveness
of U.S. policy implementation through specialization and coordination.87 A paper from
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the Strategic Studies Institute declares the interagency is inextricably bound by
“functional interdependence.”88 Each agency has its own capabilities in which it is most
skilled and experienced. The interagency exists to facilitate the application of the greatest
depth and breadth of skills to national security objectives. “It is an iron rule of the
interagency that no national security or international affairs issue can be resolved by one
agency alone.”89 In particular, DoD and DoS rely on mutual and complementary
capabilities, and that of the intelligence community, to most effectively implement U.S.
foreign policy.90 Although the scope of this thesis is not domestic, and thus will focus
largely on global interactions between DoD, DoS, USAID, and the Intelligence
Community (IC), interagency coordination is essential for the effective functioning of
many aspects of government, including border operations and emergency response.91
Interagency cooperation is mired in conflict, as agencies are constantly competing
for funding and operational space.92 The informal and loose structure of the interagency
means cooperation that does occur is largely voluntary and rarely consistent. Bob Ulin of
the Simons Center writes that many confuse the interagency for an actual ‘entity.’ “In
fact, it’s an elusive concept of voluntary associations of federal departments and
agencies, each having its own culture, operating procedures, jargon and rules.”93 Ulin
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writes that the root of interagency issues lies in the lack of positions with authority across
departments, aside from the President.94 State’s “Chief of Mission authority is the only
formal inter-department executive authority in existence below the President.”95
However, combatant commands integrate interagency advisors to varying degrees.96 U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) has “over 30 representatives from more than 10 federal
agencies… [who] are placed through the command and embedded directly with DoD
staff.”97 According to Ulin, the only other true interagency organizations are the Joint
Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs).98 Kenneth Dahl, a colonel in the U.S. Army, authored
a paper for Brookings in which he scathingly criticizes the state of the interagency.99 The
issues he raises are similar to those Ulin broaches – the structure of the federal
government inhibits effective interagency cooperation.100 The vertical nature of the
federal government results in difficulty communicating between agencies.101 Dahl posits
that successful interagency cooperation will only be possible with comprehensive reform
similar to that accomplished by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.102
The incentive structure of the executive branch requires agencies to compete for
funding and operational space, causing persistent underlying, or overt, tension regardless
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of the benefits of cooperation. In 2017, DoS’ share of overseas contingency operations
(OCO) funding (between DoD and DoS) was 24%, far higher than the 7% it had
remained at since 2001.103 Despite the increased awareness of the need for funding DoS
in 2017, the Trump Administration appears intent on refocusing funding on the military.
The President’s 2018 budget allocates over $1 trillion more in discretionary spending to
defense programs than non-defense programs over the next four years, with the chasm
growing larger over time.104 Funding is a critical influence on how the U.S. conducts
foreign policy. Interagency dynamics are shaped by the militarization of foreign policy as
a function of congressional funding preferences, distribution of resources, and cultural
gaps manifesting as differing incentives for short-term fixes over long-term
programming. With such great obstacles standing in the way of effective interagency
coordination – disproportionate favor for the military in terms of funding and allocation
of responsibility, cultural boundaries, and bureaucratic inefficiencies – one would be
surprised to find it at all. Thus, it is essential to examine interagency coordination where
it operates effectively, and ascertain how it may be transposed to CVE.
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Chapter 3: Effective Interagency Coordination - Joint Interagency Task Force–
South
A paper from National Defense University’s Strategic Perspectives expresses the
widespread intragovernmental view that Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–
South or JIATF-S) is the “gold standard for interagency cooperation.”105 Among other
things, JIATF–South’s primary mission is to “promote regional security cooperation and
coordinate US country-team and partner-nation counternarcotics initiatives.”106 JIATF–
South is responsible for “more than 40 percent of global cocaine interdiction” and seizes
more than five times as much cocaine as the rest of the U.S. government combined.107 In
the above paper, Evan Munsing and Christopher Lamb attribute JIATF–South’s great
success to seamless interagency coordination, as does the rest of the U.S. government,
given that up to 10,000 people are hosted by JIATF–South in an attempt to gain insight
into the Task Force’s success.108 The commander of U.S. Southern Command
(USSOUTHCOM) praised JIATF–South in the highest manner, citing it as the model for
all ‘whole of government’ efforts.109 JIATF–South’s interagency operations are no minor
collaboration. JIATF–South consists of “4 branches of the military, 9 different agencies,
and 11 partner nations.”110
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JIATF–South was no sudden miracle, no chance stumble onto a magic formula of
interagency efficacy. It evolved in stages, beginning with executive and legislative
agreement that drug trafficking was a threat to U.S. national security.112 The final
predecessor was a troubled Joint Task Force: JTF–4, plagued by issues of differing
communication procedures, approach to objectives, opaque authority structures, and lack
of integration of intelligence and kinetic operations. The Joint Task Force was somewhat
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successful in its mission, although this was despite its lack of interagency coordination,
not because it held a semblance of it.113
JIATF–South was crafted under the Clinton administration, during a review of
national strategy on drug operations.114 Improved collaboration was spawned by a
massive slash in resources, forcing the Task Force to more precise in its actions, thereby
relying heavily on human intelligence. Subsequently, intelligence became fused with
kinetic operations, eliminating a major flaw of JTF–4.115 Organizations engaging in nonkinetic activities may draw lessons from this close cooperation insofar as the analysis
supporting an organization’s efforts must be done by those with an intimate knowledge of
the requirements of the operating environment and the capacity of their organization.
Christopher Lamb’s paper extracted the most important, generalizable factors that
are essential to JIATF-S’s success. For interagency success, there must be a lead agency,
and agencies involved must have incentives for pursuing the mission. Further, the
problem being tackled must be clear, “with a meaningful and measurable outcome.”116
Lamb states that understanding agency partners is important – understanding partner
strengths and weaknesses allows a more productive relationship. What he implies without
stating is that interagency success relies on overcoming cultural boundaries separating
partner agencies. Operation success also relies on developing networks beyond primary
partners to interested parties that can support the operation. Finally, a successful
interagency operation requires resources.117
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Where individuals originate from a variety of parent agencies, incentives are
difficult to reconcile. To create an environment where individual goals align with that of
the Task Force, JIATF–South personnel are all evaluated by those on the Task Force, not
their parent agency.118 Dr. John Fishel, an expert on civil-military relations, attributes
JIATF–South’s success to its organizational structure – citing the power wielded by the
Task Force commander over individuals from other agencies as an essential ingredient to
effective functioning. He writes: “The real reason JIATF-S works is that it is structurally
an organization that has unity of command. The director is a commander with the
authority to hire and fire, as well as to task, organize, and direct actions.”119
Munsing and Lamb examine JIATF–South’s interagency success through “10
variables drawn from the organization and management literature on cross-functional
teams.”120 The variables exist along a spectrum, from ‘organizational-level’ to
‘individual-level.’ The broadest of the variables encapsulates the environment an
organization exists in, meaning efficacy can rely on variables outside of an agency’s
control. At the other end of the spectrum lies factors relevant to single people, yet may
drastically impact the success of a mission.121 One notable quality, given the conflicting
nature of agency incentives across the government, is JIATF–South’s sole leadership role
in its operating area. It is the only entity authorized to “perform detection and monitoring
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within its 42-million-square-mile operating area.”122 Although its authority does not
officially extend beyond that, any entity with a similar objective to JIATF–South is
compelled to cooperate to some degree, then drawn into JIATF–South’s fold due to
effective leadership.123 An additional note is that representatives from outside agencies in
JIATF–South usually hold a high enough rank that they may speak and act on their
agency’s behalf.124 Further, partner agencies often remarked that they were willing to
cooperate because JIATF–South provided “a great return on their investment,” giving
credit for interdictions to their partners.125 As the authority of Joint Task Forces is
“largely voluntary,” those agencies participating do so at their own discretion, yet are
willing to submit given the proven efficacy of the JIATF model.126 JIATF–South
demonstrates that a strong lead organization facilitates more effective operations by
streamlining and decreasing redundancy.
JIATF–South structured teams to maximize effectiveness, directing resources
towards what proved effective, in its case, “diverse intelligence collection,” while
allowing internal fluidity in the face of an adapting threat.127 Munsen and Lamb point to
JIATF–South’s unique “set of detailed interagency and international standard operating
procedures… a 600-page manual that is updated on almost a daily basis and translated
into several languages… based on years of practice and experimentation, but also on
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careful negotiations that demonstrate respect for other organizational practices.”128
Important phrases have single definitions and no swaying from the procedures is
permitted.129 In JIATF–South’s role as leader in counternarcotics in their operational
space, it sets detailed guidelines for how it and its affiliates must operate, and mandates
communication in a style all actors can understand. Unity of command is at the core of
JIATF-S’s success. The Task Force retains tactical control of all assets provided by other
agencies.
Frustrated with agencies rotating officers through JIATF–South right as they fully
adjust to the situation, the Task Force requires personnel to stay for at least a year,
preferably longer, and maintains a core of civilians, some of whom have worked there for
over 20 years. In terms of the social dynamic of JIATF–South, “there is no substitute for
physical proximity and personal interaction.”130 Further, JIATF–South “is one of the
relatively rare interagency entities that emphasizes new member training.”131 JIATF–
South stresses the necessity of personnel longevity and networks of relationships in
operational success.
Joint Interagency Task Forces serve as a bridge between policy and operational
and tactical-level operations. James McLay, a lieutenant commander in the Coast Guard,
the branch of the military most involved in JIATF–South, writes that Joint Interagency
Task Forces, particularly JIATF–South, serve as a “striking exception” to the many
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operational failures that occur as a result of a chasm between the policy-making level and
the operational-level, and the subsequent “lack of unity of effort.”132
Applying JIATF-S Lessons to Interagency Coordination on CVE
JIATF–South serves as an effective model for interagency operations, even those
pertaining to CVE. One may question the applicability of JIATF–South’s experience to
CVE if the Task Force focused solely on counternarcotics. However, Rear Admiral
Towney, leader of JIATF–South, explained that JIATF–South’s mission is now
something far broader: “We are an interagency and international coalition, brought
together by a tactical mission, working to facilitate the eventual dismantlement of large
criminal enterprises aimed at undermining stability and security in the Western
Hemisphere.”133 JIATF-S’s success also heavily relies on an extensive network beyond
merely the US interagency. Rear Admiral Tomney states: “JIATF South seeks to
continually develop closer relationships with all of our partner nations… to facilitate two
primary goals: 100 percent domain awareness and an unprecedented degree of
information coordination.”134 Joint Task Forces’ networks enable their capabilities, a
lesson equally applicable to other interagency processes. “The USG interagency process
requires the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the
capabilities of USG agencies, IGOs, the HN, and NGOs.”135
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JIATF South offers insight into effective interagency coordination. It facilitates
coordination between agencies and nations at the tactical and operational level, and
bridges the gap between policy-making and the operational and tactical levels. JIATFs
act as incubators for experience, facilitating efficient passage of relevant knowledge and
skills to newcomers and between those working together. JIATF South’s structure and
area of operation bears some similarities with CVE programs. Given CVE programming
is unique to each environment, the ways in which relevant actors must coordinate
somewhat reflect that of JIATF South.
Referring back to the requirements for CVE, an effective CVE operation needs:
deep knowledge of local culture and societal structures; autonomy for those on the
ground to more effectively use their expertise; matching “CVE responsibilities to
authorities, resources, and accesses;”136 ensuring CVE actions are aligned with messaging
campaigns; a lead agency; most importantly, CVE requires resources and coordination to
effectively apply relevant skills where they’re needed most in the complex mass of
operations that may comprise CVE.
JIATF-S demonstrated a capacity to fulfill, or improve the conduct of, many of
the requirements of CVE. JIATF-S relied on developing networks beyond primary
partners; CVE relies entirely on an enactor’s capacity to develop and strengthen
communal networks. Cultural friction between agencies is an obstacle of interagency
coordination, one that JIATF-S navigates well. To create an environment where
individual goals align with that of the Task Force, JIATF–South personnel are all

Department of Defense Defense Science Board, “Task Force on Department of Defense Strategy to
Counter Violent Extremism Outside of the United States,” April, 2015, 2,
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/DSB-CVE-FinalReport-April172015.pdf
136

Gush 35

evaluated by those on the Task Force, not their parent agency.137 Further, DoD’s
authority as lead agency, and JIATF-S’ unity of command under its commander, ensure
smooth operations. JIATF-S’s 600-page operational manual is updated daily and
maintains a nuanced awareness of its partner’s practices, while ensuring unity of effort
and effective communication.138 To ensure efficient operations, representatives from
outside agencies may usually act on their agency’s behalf, without needing to constantly
refer back to a superior.139 Participation in JIATF-S is voluntary – partners are drawn in
by its success and resources. Any actors with similar objectives to JIATF-S thus
cooperate with it to some extent, then are drawn further into JIATF-S’ fold due to its
efficacy. CVE would benefit from a similar effect, drawing in organizations with similar
goals to combine resources and expertise. CVE requires applying the most relevant skills
to operations – as CVE is still evolving, effective CVE requires the ability to adapt to
incoming knowledge and constantly changing circumstances. JIATF–S structured teams
to maximize effectiveness, directing resources towards what proved effective, while
allowing internal fluidity in the face of an adapting threat.140 Finally, a successful
interagency operation, and a more effective CVE operation, requires resources. 141
JIATF-S offers ingredients for successful CVE that are generalizable to the point
of being applicable to the CVE interagency environment. The most significant additions
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to CVE operations, if they were to follow the JIATF-S model, would be: greater
resources, more effective coordination, and better information-sharing.
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Chapter 4: Interagency Coordination on CVE
In their Joint Strategy, DoS and USAID clearly define CVE, the methods they
foresee enhancing CVE, and the measures by which they will evaluate their progress.
They appear to be the primary drivers of U.S. international CVE, meaning evaluation of
CVE coordination will likely rely on their framework and perspectives. The document
defines CVE, claiming it “refers to proactive actions to counter efforts by violent
extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address
specific factors that facilitate violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to
violence.”142 The document reiterates the respective CVE strategy of each entity,
considering two primary targets: the underlying reasons for an individual being
vulnerable to radicalization, and the platforms used by extremist groups for recruitment.
The document supports CVE being part of a grander development strategy, promoting
“good governance and the rule of law.”143 Neither agency is taking a leadership role in
CVE abroad. They each conduct their own operations respectively, stating they intend to
coordinate their efforts. The strategy fails to mention interagency collaboration until the
last few paragraphs, in which it adds that “a working group of core State, USAID, and
interagency stakeholders will oversee and coordinate implementation of this strategy.”144
As far this author can find, such a working group has yet to be formed. The experience of
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JIATF-S accurately predicted that the lack of a strong lead agency inhibits interagency
coordination – CVE suffers from a vacuum of leadership.
The 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review suggests that DoS
and USAID prioritize CVE over all other aims. It places “Preventing and Mitigating
Conflict and Violent Extremism” as the first priority.145 The document emphasizes the
need for interagency cooperation, beginning both subsections of the CVE “strategic
priorities” summary by stating its intention to fulfill its CVE objectives via cooperation
with relevant partners.146 Either DoS and USAID have lost interest in CVE since 2016, or
the agencies are strategically wording their strategies for survival under a tough
administration.
State’s Joint Strategic Plan with USAID for 2018-2022 outlines its general
strategy, with a few mentions of countering violent extremism.147 However, if the
respective agencies’ interest in CVE, or their commitment to collaboration, is to be
judged by the frequency of CVE mentions in the document, then CVE appears as a low
priority. Though one must consider the precarious position both agencies find themselves
in under President Trump’s administration. DoS and USAID reworded their priorities in
their most recent strategy to appeal the present administration – this may explain the
apparent downplaying of CVE. No such issue appears to arise in the case of JIATF-S and
counternarcotic operations.148
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In 2015, DoS invested in developing the RESOLVE Network, an organization of
researchers dedicated to improving CVE.149 The RESOLVE Network’s library “contains
2,395 documents from the 1990s to 2017” on topics relevant to CVE programming.150
State’s commitment to CVE research places it in a suitable spot for leading CVE policy,
but its leadership would be restricted to that of CVE strategy and tactics by its lack of
capacity and resources – it does not have the capacity to lead an operation like JIATF-S –
leaving the complex and costly job of coordinating implementation to the only agency
capable of it – DoD.
According to GAO, the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
demonstrates aspects of productive interagency coordination in a CVE program. Two of
the more advanced points in GAO’s interagency checklist are worth noting, as they are
the first markers on GAO’s checklist that would display actual implementation of
interagency coordination, not merely the spoken intention for it, and are not found in the
TSCTP: 1) “leverage their resources;” 2) “establish compatible procedures to operate
across agency boundaries.”151 Surely interagency coordination is minimal until these
steps, as yet unreached by DoS and USAID, are attempted. Both of these items are
integral to the success of JIATF-S, and should be pursued in the case of CVE.
GAO gives significant credit to surprisingly minor steps in interagency
coordination. If GAO’s checklist is to be regarded as an establishment of effective
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interagency collaboration, GAO regards creating a joint-strategy document as important a
step as those actions mentioned above. GAO remarks that the presence of such a
document helps agencies “overcome differences in missions, cultures, and established
ways of doing business; help agencies align activities and resources; and can reinforce
agency accountability.”152 While missing a joint-strategy is certainly a mistake, one that
undoubtedly impedes agencies’ ability to operate together effectively, possessing one is
no guarantee that agencies implement its intentions. Further, a joint-strategy may also be
so broad that it fails to apply accurately to local operating environments. Perhaps the
steps taken toward interagency coordination are significant for agencies without the
capacity for implemented coordination. GAO even writes that coordination between
agencies in TSCTP was filled with friction over a variety of operational matters.153 By
giving excessive credit for minor interagency actions, GAO fails to motivate a pursuit of
effective interagency coordination in CVE.
What does Implementation Look Like Presently? – A Glance at Africa
In a 2015 press release, the White House announced its intention to engage fully
with CVE efforts in East Africa, budgeting $40 million to that end.154 The same press
release details all CVE initiatives in East Africa. A major CVE initiative in the region is
DoS’ Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), a long-term
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capacity building initiative across 10 East African countries.155 PREACT’s strategy was
drafted by DoS in 2009 in response to the 2011 U.S. National Strategy for
Counterterrorism.
PREACT was designed to be the U.S. government initiative for long-term
engagement and capacity building to combat evolving terrorist threats in East
Africa… The PREACT program is managed by State’s regional Bureau of
African Affairs, but draws on the expertise of several other bureaus and U.S.
agencies to implement its activities.156
PREACT targets multiple sectors, including: the “military, law enforcement, and civilian
actors,” attempting to expand their capacity and encourage cooperation.157 PREACT’s
activities range from enhancing police force capacity to training teachers to identify
vulnerable individuals.158 For partner-nation military capacity building, DoS “generally
implements activities through DOD’s AFRICOM.”159 DoS has also funded USAID
programs targeting disenfranchised youth in Kenya and Somalia using PREACT funds.160
Further, the DoS Bureau of African Affairs “[convenes] a routine working group with
relevant State bureaus and U.S. agencies.” The working group is used to report on, and
evaluate, PREACT activities.161 The interagency coordination displayed in PREACT is a
great first step. However, GAO reports that, even though DoS formed a working group to
direct, track and evaluate PREACT activities, “PREACT… lacks comprehensive
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documentation of factors considered when selecting activities and does not routinely
maintain information on the status of PREACT activities or funding.”162 Further,
PREACT has mismanaged funds in a surprising manner: “GAO discovered that State
mistakenly allocated PREACT funds to Mauritius, which is not a PREACT partner, and
the managing bureau was unaware of $3 million in unobligated balances in Antiterrorism
Assistance that are no longer available for obligation.”163 Such issues have not arisen in
JIATF-S, suggesting more cohesive interagency coordination may be a factor in
preventing their emergence.
Another State-led CVE program is the Security Governance Initiative (SGI),
which aims to address the security challenges of partner nations, with a deep
understanding of the major issues in each environment through cooperation with civil
society.164 SGI places emphasis on the thorough coordination of all actors involved in the
capacity building process: SGI “promotes both U.S. and partner whole-of-government
coordination to comprehensively address complex security issues.”165 Other regional
CVE programs include USAID’s Yes Youth Can! in Kenya, which promotes youth
economic empowerment and leadership,166 and USAID’s Transition Initiative for
Stabilization (TIS) and Strategic Response Activity (SRA), which aim to enhance
relationships between “civilian government officials, community leaders and civil
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society.”167 The White House CVE press release sums CVE activity in the region to
include: enhancing cooperation between security sectors, civilian governments, and
communities; “strengthening the capacity and networks of civil society;” increasing
opportunities for communities to “positively intervene and disrupt the cycle of
radicalization to violence.”168
SGI’s 2015 review declares that DoS setup an interagency office for coordinating
efforts pertaining to SGI.169 In the 2016 review, little mention is made of interagency
collaboration, and certainly not to the scale posited in the previous year. The 2016 review
notes that interagency workshops took place with Ghana to “improve interagency
collaboration and enhance the coordination of international maritime security efforts.”170
Yes Youth Can!, TIS, and SRA documents do not mention interagency collaboration,
although Yes Youth Can! is implemented by Mercy Corps in conjunction with local
government partners.171 The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University
of Chicago conducted an extensive review of Yes Youth Can!, using focus groups and
collecting information from 10,000 impacted youth.172 NORC found that Yes Youth Can!
“led to improvements in youth self-esteem, improved relations between youth and their
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communities and some increased political engagement.”173 Yes Youth Can! didn’t
entirely alleviate some youths’ feeling of alienation from politics, but the program built
and maintained trust with the targeted community, facilitating further projects addressing
any remaining vulnerabilities. USAID’s CVE fact sheet for Kenya and Somalia, the only
fact sheet available for USAID CVE in Africa, makes no mention of interagency
collaboration.174 In USAID’s 2016-2021 East Africa Regional Development Cooperation
Strategy, interagency collaboration arises significantly only once.175 State’s overview of
its activities in Africa concerning terrorism mention capacity building of foreign partners,
but the only instance of interagency collaboration in East Africa is that of partner
governments.176 DoS states that Kenya’s civil society organizations play a role in CVE
“often with assistance from the United States and other international partners.”177
Interagency Coordination, DoD, and CVE
Resources are essential for the success of an interagency operation, as Christopher
Lamb asserted, and DoD, as the largest agency by orders of magnitude involved in
interagency operations, is capable of commanding the greatest resources. “JIATF-South’s
requests for funds and its operating budget flow through DOD, and specifically through
USSOUTHCOM… The department provides consistent budgetary support, funding the
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headquarters, its operations and some assets, equipment, and training.”178 The Office of
the Secretary of Defense also advocates for the Task Force’s funding.179 This is not to say
that JIATF-S is wholly funded by DoD: “other organizations contribute planes and ships
to operations that JIATF-South plans and runs.”180 But DoD is the primary guarantor of
Task Force funding.
Under the present administration, both DoS and USAID are facing assaults on
their budgets.181 Even without the pressure of the Trump Administration, neither USAID
nor DoS can presently afford an expansion of CVE programming to the scale of JIATF-S.
Thus, neither DoS nor USAID are capable of running a coordinated interagency
operation of the same quality as DoD. The primary limiting factor is resources – DoD
underwrites the majority of JIATF-S’s costs, and neither DoS nor USAID has anything
close to DoD’s resources. At best, USAID and DoS have a fraction of DoD’s experience
running field operations. DoD’s wealth of experience with its JIATFs and assorted other
interagency operations places it far above DoS and USAID in terms of knowledge needed
for running an interagency operation.
DoD is the primary source of resources for JIATF-S. DoD has incredible levels of
experience in field operations and more interagency coordination experience in securityrelated scenarios than any other USG actor. JIATF-S demonstrates DoD’s capacity to
direct an extensive assortment of actors in a complex, fluid operation. According to the
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requirements of CVE and interagency coordination, it is logical to posit that DoD would
be the most effective lead agency for CVE operations.
NGOs have made clear their objections to DoD involvement in CVE. Why would
DoS and USAID also hesitate to implore DoD involvement? The broader context of the
battle for operational space somewhat explains their lack of effort to draw DoD into
CVE. The militarization of foreign policy is a pervasive issue in the USG. DoD’s
encroachment on State’s areas of operation threatens the nature of diplomacy, and some
would say its efficacy. The militarization of foreign policy is the shift toward operational
and tactical control of foreign policy by the military. 182 The U.S. military lacks the
specific diplomatic expertise that members of the State Department have acquired over
many years of diplomacy. The military “conducts diplomacy differently, towards
different ends, usually simultaneously with civilian foreign policy endeavors, but not
always coordinated with them.”183 The varied skillsets of DoD and DoS enable a broad
range of actions, diplomatic and otherwise; it would be a mistake to impede on either
agency’s ability to function within its operational space. Yet some believe that is
occurring: DoD is pushing out DoS. According to Franz-Stefan Gady, the perception by
foreign nations that the U.S. military is now conducting U.S. diplomacy alters foreign
perception of U.S. diplomacy to its detriment. As he writes in The Diplomat: “The
militarization of U.S. foreign policy makes it more likely that other countries will
perceive the United States as dangerous and hostile, and this is not in the U.S. national
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interest.”184 He points to discussions of cybersecurity with China as an example, citing
Chinese reluctance being largely due to the perception that the U.S. military “dominates
the discussion on cybersecurity within the U.S. government.”185 Brookings supports
Drezner’s point, writing “the U.S. State Department… [doesn’t have] any significant
power over… deliberations on cybersecurity, nor any depth of expertise on the topic
itself.”186 Thus, State’s lack of resources rears itself as a critical issue. The perception is
damaging, yet so is the reality. According to Franz-Stefan, the problems arising from the
militarization of U.S. foreign policy are two-fold: the U.S. military encroaching on the
conduct of diplomacy needlessly restricts the use of U.S. diplomatic expertise, and the
perception that the U.S. military dominates foreign policy discussion results in reluctance
to engage on pressing issues.187
In terms of CVE, DoD is not moving to take leadership from DoS and USAID.
However, DoD’s dominance of foreign policy now extends to development assistance,
and this has consequences.188 For example, as DoD increased its role in the dispensation
of military aid to Afghanistan, most funding was shifted to the areas with greatest
conflict, rather than more stable regions where the assistance would have greater effect
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for the recipients.189 Additionally, attacks on aid workers due to their perceived
complicity with military operations have taken place from Afghanistan to Darfur.190
Many in the development community believe CVE cannot be led by the military,
and further, that any connection to the military undermines effective CVE. After
President Obama’s 2015 CVE Summit, a coalition of 40 U.S. NGOs published a
statement expressing their concern that securitized responses are unsuitable for CVE, and
detrimental for all development assistance.191 Their concerns about securitization may be
split into two distinct concerns: 1) “Subordinating development assistance under a CVE
approach risks undermining the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance;” 2) Military
responses to threats where non-kinetic responses are more suitable only serve to
exacerbate the underlying issue.192 The NGOs are concerned that the prioritization of
CVE over development assistance will securitize the entire field of development. Further,
the NGOs argue that a public and prominent connection between development assistance
and military operations damages the efficacy of foreign aid by undermining the trust of
local partners.193 However, DoD leading CVE would be the simplest path to the capacity
and interagency coordination needed for more effective programs, and enable a simpler
transition to a model similar to JIATF-S. However, these improvements are threatened by
the impact of further militarization of development assistance – if DoD takes the lead,
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CVE projects may lose access to vulnerable communities, or the ability to gain those
communities’ trust.
Intelligence Community
The intelligence community would be a valuable addition to an interagency CVE
operation. They play a key role in the success of JIATF-S. CVE requires deep knowledge
of local politics and societal structures, but also the ability to identify which communities
are most vulnerable to the radicalization efforts of violent extremists. In his book The Art
of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service, Henry A.
Crumpton, former director of the CIA, writes: “By September 2001, CTC [the CIA’s
Counterterrorism Center, where Crumpton worked at the time] had more than a hundred
human sources operating in Afghanistan in every province and tribe. This included
penetrations of the Taliban and the support networks for AQ… We had other technical
collection systems in place. We knew Afghanistan, friend and foe. With the scope and
integration of technical and human sources, we would be ready.”194 Forming teams of
interagency analysts drastically improved the efficacy of counterterrorism Special
Operations Forces (SOF) operations.195 Cohabitation of SOF operators and intelligence
analysts significantly streamlined operations and eliminated the risk of stale intelligence
jeopardizing mission success.196 The benefit of internal intelligence gathering is shown in
JIATF-S, whose intelligence gathering capacity, and its fusion with operations, is

Henry A. Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service (New
York: Penguin Group, 2013), 160.
195
Christopher Lamb, “Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration,” Journal of Strategic Security 7, No. 2
(Summer 2014): 8-9, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1371&context=jss
196
Ibid., 9.
194

Gush 50

credited for much of its success.197 In the pursuit of effective CVE operations, DoS and
USAID are lacking the intelligence gathering capacity of the U.S. Intelligence
Community (IC), or at the very least timely delivery of relevant intelligence.
As beneficial as the inclusion of the IC in CVE may be, the knowledge it brings is
drastically reduced in value if CVE operations do not have the resources to act on it.
Simply throwing members of the IC into CVE, without constructing effective
mechanisms for their involvement and providing the resources to act on its information,
would be a tragic misuse of their skills and hobble their ability to perform, given how
necessary extensive resources are for effective analysis of terrorist groups.198 In an
excerpt of Reflections on 10 Years of Counterterrorism Analysis hosted on the CIA’s
website, Jeffrey Builta and Eric Heller, senior officers in the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA),199 write that for effective interagency integration, “continuous engagement” is
necessary. “This function, however, places heavy costs on organizations. One of them is
the personnel grind; a second is the demand for continuity. Professionals in CT
organizations are in a constant state of deployment, recovery, and preparation for
redeployment.”200 Continuing, Bulita and Heller, in reference to operations resembling
CVE, write:
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These kinds of operations are far more difficult to support and conduct than
traditional CT operations because of the scope and the range of analytic skills and
organizational entities required to carry them out…analysts and operators will
have to build even more diffuse communities of interest and sources of
information than are normally considered for lethal operations against
terrorists.201
If CVE operations adopted an interagency model similar to that of JIATF-S, with
a well-resourced lead agency experienced in interagency field operations, the IC would
fit seamlessly into CVE operations, just as it does in JIATF-S. The inclusion of the IC in
an interagency CVE effort would grant deep insight to the activities, direction, and plans
of violent extremist groups, facilitating a more coherent, targeted CVE program.
The Future of U.S. CVE Abroad
As nebulous a concept as CVE is, its goal is clear: combat violent extremist
narratives, recruitment, and operational space, and disrupt the cycle of violence that
perpetuates violent extremism. CVE operations do not take novel form – they are
identical to those seen in state building and development assistance, merely securitized,
only targeting communities vulnerable to predatory violent extremists. CVE has grand,
ambitious goals, and is acknowledged as an essential pillar of a complete U.S.
counterterrorism strategy. Yet implementation of operations working towards these goals
has been lackluster. There are a couple prominent issues facing U.S. CVE abroad, in no
particular order: 1) an identity crisis, and 2) a lack of coordination.
If DoD were to lead a JIATF for CVE, comparable to JIATF-S, the issues listed
would be largely resolved. Interagency coordination on CVE cannot emulate the success

intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-3/pdfs/Builta-Heller-CTBestPractices-Eversion7-Oct-2011.pdf
201
Ibid., 11-12.
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of JIATF-S without the presence of DoD. Granted, direct military involvement in
presently non-militarized CVE programs may erode the trust of local partners. But CVE
programming need not be conducted any more by DoD than it is currently. DoD could
lead a JIATF oriented toward counterterrorism that also facilitates significantly more
funding and expertise being applied to CVE. This solution presupposes a desire to
commit to CVE of a grander scale, with all the associated costs that accompany it.
U.S. CVE abroad conducted by DoS and USAID fails to acknowledge that it is
securitized state-building and development. As a function of its role in counterterrorism
and the nature of targeting communities based purely on their vulnerability to violent
extremism, CVE is securitized development in a foreign nation. Association with the
military may undermine trust with local partners, but failing to acknowledge that CVE is
securitized development with inherently security-related ends is to deny an obvious truth
and impede CVE’s evolution. This identity crisis is obscuring the fact that CVE is a shift
of resources towards defense regardless of DoD’s level of involvement. Given USAID
and State’s already limited budget in comparison to DoD, a shift in their programming
away from providing assistance to those most in need, and toward only those vulnerable
to violent extremist recruitment, is a funneling of funds towards DoD, whose CT goals
benefit more from CVE than non-securitized development assistance. Recognizing this is
important – DoS and USAID may raise the question of increased funding if they are
sharing the burden of DoD-oriented missions.
If CVE is to truly accomplish its ambitious goals, those engaging in it would
benefit greatly from increased coordination, and consequently, greater resources. In its
current form, CVE programs have, at best, limited interagency coordination. To truly
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attack the radicalization efforts of violent extremist organizations, CVE must be a
coordinated effort, informed by as many expert voices the USG can muster. Notably, the
inclusion of the IC would elevate information gathering. JIATF-S provides a deep look at
effective interagency coordination. Transposing lessons learned at JIATF-S to CVE
programming would facilitate better interagency coordination, and subsequently, CVE
operations of a higher quality and efficacy.
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